Privatization, as one of the key instruments for restructuring economies, has garnered significant attention in many countries over recent decades, aiming to enhance efficiency, promote competitiveness, and reduce state ownership. In Iran, the implementation of the general policies of Article 44 of the Constitution has elevated privatization to a central pillar of economic policymaking. However, the privatization experience in strategic industries, particularly the petroleum sector, has been fraught with considerable institutional and governance challenges. The present study seeks to analyze the efficacy of privatization policies in Iran's oil industry, examining this process not merely as a transfer of ownership, but rather as an institution- and governance-centered phenomenon. Methodologically, this research adopts a qualitative approach with an applied objective, and data were collected through documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with experts in energy policy. Data analysis was conducted using Braun and Clarke's thematic analysis method, employing MAXQDA software. The findings led to the identification of four major themes: the dominance of short-term financial logic over developmental privatization objectives, weak regulatory governance and institutional incoordination, the failure to effect genuine managerial control transfer, and the reproduction of monopoly in a new form. The results indicate that privatization in Iran's petroleum industry has largely taken the form of "quasi-privatization," failing to achieve goals such as increased productivity, competitiveness, and reduced government intervention. The paper concludes by offering policy recommendations at strategic, institutional, and operational levels, emphasizing the necessity of reforming the governance and regulatory framework as a prerequisite for successful privatization in the petroleum sector.